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Introduction 
 
On 1 June 1958, Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France as the last Prime Minister of 
the Fourth Republic. In the preceding three weeks, the country had experienced a series of 
events that seemed to be dragging it towards civil war or a military coup. The regime itself 
seemed to be collapsing, and the political elites were unable to impose their authority on the 
deteriorating situation. Twelve years earlier, in January 1946, de Gaulle had resigned as 
Prime Minister, leaving the new Fourth Republic to its fate. He had returned to his country 
home in Colombey-les-deux-églises, about 200kms south east of Paris, to write his Memoirs 
and observe politics sadly from a distance. His modest home and the village of Colombey 
became a kind of mythical site and place of pilgrimage where the great man lived. He was 
considered a controversial figure by many during the 1940s and 1950s, but for a brief, crucial 
moment in 1958, he was seen as the only person who could prevent the country from 
descending into chaos. 
 
The Algerian War had begun four years before in 1954, and in 1958 the government was still 
searching for a solution to the continuing crisis. Most of the French army was in Algeria 
trying to suppress the rebellion. The main problem for government was that the French state’s 
authority in Algiers was weak. Successive and unstable governments in Paris had been unable 
to impose reform or to defeat the independence movement or to satisfy the European 
Algerians, who regarded these successive governments as vacillating and untrustworthy. De 
Gaulle’s return therefore had two related aspects. On the one hand, he was to solve the 
Algerian problem, and, it was assumed, keep Algeria French. On the other, he was to restore 
the integrity of the state and the effectiveness of the government. It took him four years for 
the former, and his solution, Algerian independence, was the opposite of what had been 
expected, the opposite of what he had been brought back to do. The latter saw him, in the 
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space of six months, introduce a new constitution and a new republic which exists to this day, 
over fifty years later. 
 
Why was de Gaulle seen as legitimate? Why was he seen as able to solve both the problem of 
Algeria and the problem of France’s political instability? What were the effects of conferring 
authority upon this individual? And what effects did he then have upon French republicanism 
and the regime he created in 1958? 
 
De Gaulle’s claim to legitimacy in France’s crisis in 1958 did not arise only from his having 
become France’s Prime Minister between 1944 and 1946, nor even from his having, 
Cassandra-like, predicted and warned against the ‘immobilisme’ and instability of the Fourth 
Republic, and gone unheeded. An even greater source of de Gaulle’s claim to legitimacy – 
and this was why he had been Prime Minister in 1944 – was that he had been a kind of 
warrior-philosopher of French national pride, embodying, personifying almost, French 
national identity through World War II. On 18 June 1940 de Gaulle, then a forty-nine year-
old General and junior government minister, flew to London to continue France’s struggle 
against the invading German army. He refused to accept the conditions of the armistice 
imposed upon France, or the legitimacy of the new Vichy regime, led by his former superior 
officer, Marshal Pétain. 
 
In the summer of 1944, de Gaulle entered Paris as the commander of the Free French forces, 
the liberator of the nation and the hero of the Resistance. He had been right when most others 
had been wrong, and as the head of the provisional government he saw himself as a kind of 
personalized expression of the nation as it emerged from the trauma of the 1939-45 period. 
This was the ‘persona’, the character, and the man who came back to solve France’s dire 
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problems in 1958. Another aspect of this persona – his own perceived view, his philosophy, 
his ‘vision’ –  would have crucial influence upon the nature and development of the Fifth 
Republic. One of the essential characteristics of de Gaulle’s approach was his attitude to how 
a republican regime should be organized, given France’s history and political culture. More 
importantly, this attitude was based upon a fundamental conviction that certain individuals – 
in this case, himself – were endowed with the wisdom and the duty to impose their view, 
their will, upon reality. The lone individual based his action – and this framed his political 
ethics and self-justification – upon a love for France and a devotional commitment to its well-
being. 
 
There were of course others who had different views about the organising principles of the 
republic. In the Resistance period and the post-war provisional government he had to work 
with political parties and individuals who saw good governance very differently from him, 
and disapproved of his emphasis upon personal leadership and upon himself as the solution to 
France’s problems. The antagonism between him and the political parties was one of the most 
divisive issues in French political life. In the main, the political parties were based upon the 
democratic process and upon gradualism rather than the exalted individual and an envisioning 
personalism. Many felt that Europe had seen quite enough of that in the preceding decades. 
This difficult relationship between competing conceptions of democratic republicanism 
would be formative of the Fifth Republic. 
 
The political actor who came to power therefore in 1958 was a complex, composite, and 
although acclaimed, controversial character. He was seen as singular, even unique: professing 
a philosophy of the state and of national pride; in an ambivalent relationship to republicanism 
and to the political parties; in personal terms was proud, brave, intelligent, self-certain, 
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devoted to a romantic notion of France – for many, had been anointed by history or some 
historical or mysterious force; and, finally, he was the man, the character, who had saved 
France (1940), returned in triumph (1944), then been as if rejected (1946), and was returning, 
vindicated, in dramatic circumstances, to save France once again (1958). 
 
He was in a constructive relationship with the new regime he set up, but a destructive one 
with the regime he replaced. What was his symbolic significance in the Fourth Republic as it 
unravelled? And what was his symbolic significance as he stepped up onto the political stage 
to construct his own new Fifth Republic? This ambivalence is the focus of our study, how 
this integrating of an individual persona into the mainstream functioning of a new regime 
established in dramatic circumstances affects politics, and how such a beginning and the 
decisive presence of an individual within the newly configured political institutions goes on 
affecting the regime as it evolves through his presidency, then on into the post-de Gaulle 
period up until the present day. 
 
De Gaulle brought to French politics not simply Gaullism but, as it were, himself; that is to 
say, by bringing his political ‘self’ and political persona to the heart of the Fifth Republic’s 
institutions, he changed French politics completely, and introduced elements into the French 
polity whose dynamism is still there. De Gaulle’s character and comportment meant that, in 
1958 and thenceforward, both the real personality and the ‘imagined’ political persona would 
inform politics in fundamentally new ways; and this would continue to be the case in the 
aftermath of de Gaulle’s return and in the aftermath of his departure. 
 
What all the French Presidents share is a set of circumstances in which both their real 
attitudes and actions and their symbolic selves have inordinate significance within the Fifth 
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Republic because of the way that the political performance of individuals within a particular 
configuration of institutions resonates within politics and the political culture. This is the real 
nature of the Gaullist settlement. Political ‘performance’ (of individuals – in action, in 
language, through ascription, and through the projection of a particular image) takes place 
within a particular configuration of institutions (e.g. of the presidency, Parliament, the 
parties, the media). The institutions are embedded within the political culture, and in the 
wider culture’s institutions, traditions, attitudes, memories, shared expectations, hearsay and 
experience, shared political past, shared understandings and misunderstandings of the 
meaning and significance of discourse and rhetoric and its place within the culture and within 
political relationships. Given the attitude and relationship of the French to de Gaulle in 1958 
and subsequently, his own attitudes and behaviour, and those of each of his successors and 
contenders for leadership, and their relationship to the electorate, to the ‘people’, to the 
‘nation’, and to ‘opinion’, the role and influence of culture upon the polity and institutions 
has been all the greater. The culture, in turn, is informed by myths and memories (for 
example, about France, about leadership, about past leaders, about imagined relationships 
between leaders and regime or nation, and between people and leaders). One could say this 
perhaps of all regimes: the wider culture and history and historical memory inform the 
institutions, and the configuration of these frames action, allowing political personae to act, 
perform and speak to political purpose and with a range of political outcomes. What makes 
the French case so compelling is the degree of ‘performance’ allowed to political actors given 
the configuration and the culture, and this because of the Fifth Republic’s dramatic 
beginnings and the performance of its first President. In order to demonstrate this, we shall 
take a narrative and analytical approach and show how the nature of the Fifth Republic has 
unfolded over the last fifty years. We shall analyse the narrative of the Fifth Republic through 
the prism of person and persona. 
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De Gaulle’s stamp upon French politics meant that his own intervention not only took place 
in highly dramatic circumstances, but also brought drama itself inside the parameters of the 
republic, and that in various forms, and in crucial relation to persona and to institutions, it 
remains there dynamically informing the republic. ‘Personality politics’ therefore develops 
both dramatically and dynamically, in particular in its relation to political relationships and 
imagined political relationships within the polity and culture, so that it becomes in many 
ways the motor, the driving force of politics and the organizing principle of political activity. 
After the Third Republic, the Fifth is the longest surviving regime in France since the 
Revolution. In those two hundred years and more, when compared to the UK or the US, for 
example, the French polity has been chronically unstable and fragile. In part, the longevity of 
the Fifth Republic is due to the Gaullist settlement; itself arguably unstable, that is to say, the 
bringing to the heart of the institutions and practices of the regime a romantic and chivalric 
notion of a leader being needed and called forth by history and the nation to reaffirm the 
strength of the state and the integrity of the body politic, and develop a very particular 
relationship with the ‘people’, themselves a composite – as is the leader himself or herself – 
of both real and imagined characteristics. 
 
Once the presidency of the Fifth Republic was established and took on the shape it did, it 
began to inform politics significantly. The President became the main political actor in the 
regime, with very different modes and style of political action from other regimes, whether 
presidential or not. Even though the President was the principal political actor, he also used 
all the ceremonial, ritual, and symbolic aspects of the new office to assert his position and the 
authority and legitimacy of the new regime. The presidency began to have decisive influence, 
and the political parties began to respond in a series of ways. The Gaullist settlement did not 
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just confer upon the President the authority to act in dramatic circumstances. By bringing the 
President to the heart of the institutional configuration, the Fifth Republic made the President 
central in all circumstances, and the character and comportment of the President also became 
central and formative. After de Gaulle, all the Presidents, in a variety of ways, asserted and 
reasserted the centrality of themselves and their persona as decisive political agencies within 
the configuration of institutions and in relation to opinion. This scope for presidential 
initiative and its emphasis upon the personal, and the consequences of these, link Charles de 
Gaulle through Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, François Mitterrand and 
Jacques Chirac, to Nicolas Sarkozy. Let us narrate the Fifth Republic from this perspective. 
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1: 1958: The Gaullist Settlement and French Politics 
 
 
The Elements of the New Republic in 1958 
 
De Gaulle’s new Republic had two essential characteristics: the centrality of the personal, and 
the emergence of complexity. First, it introduced into the new configuration of political 
institutions the primacy of the President and all that flows from this as regards personal 
power, executive authority and decision making and its relation to public policy and the 
influence of the political parties. In so doing, it increased the significance of the interplay of 
the personal and the institutional. This is why strictly constitutional or institutional 
approaches to the Fifth Republic are inadequate, for what de Gaulle did was to add as a 
permanent and complex feature of the Republic the influence of the personal within the 
institutional. And the personal is not just personal, but cultural and relational, as we shall see. 
Beyond giving the President political primacy and importance within a given protocol, de 
Gaulle brought a dramatic but marginal political style and set of relations within 
republicanism into the heart of its institutions thereby transforming it. 
 
 Personal authority for de Gaulle meant the authority to act, based upon an imagined 
(inter)relationship between a visionary individual called forth by history, and the people who 
‘recognize’ him and his authority to act. This brings us to a major consequence of this new 
and central relationship. At the very moment that the mass media itself comes into the 
mainstream of modern society, ‘opinion’ takes on a privileged role.i ‘Opinion’ is a contested 
term, and we shall use it here in a wide sense, in its most diverse range of meanings and 
categories, in order to show how it, or perhaps rather, they – opinions, become central players 
in the regime.  Opinion is appealed to by political actors, referred to by the media; it is 
‘imagined’ and given discursive reality. It also has in many forms a reality or realities of its 
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own. Opinion may be the nation, as perceived by de Gaulle, as the ‘Françaises, Français’ he 
always addressed in his broadcasts, or as a series of opinion polls, or the expressed result of 
an election or referendum, or an extrapolated population based upon consumption, or opinion 
as expressed through trade unions, associations, street demonstrations (orderly or disorderly), 
or newspapers, TV viewers, or anxious parents, disaffected youth, or any range of 
measurements and frameworks, ascriptions or assertions. Opinion may be pro or anti de 
Gaulle (or indifferent), pro or anti politicians; or it may be a movement large enough or bold 
enough to claim affinity with the country’s revolutionary, or anti-revolutionary traditions, or 
with ‘la France profonde’. However it is manifested or imagined as manifested, opinion 
becomes from 1958 onwards a major player in French politics (irrespective of whether it 
itself has any real power). A range of opinion/s and especially opinion as evoked in the 
imagination and discourse of the leader, and opinion as mediated through the mass media, 
floods into the institutions, practices and political exchanges in the republic, bringing the 
wider mass culture as well as the myriad of more discrete cultures to political prominence.ii 
 
Introducing the culturaliii in this way into the mainstream of the political and the institutional 
meant that the discursive and rhetorical also became central; and unlike the relative isolation 
and self-referring nature of the political discourse of the Fourth Republic, the Fifth becomes 
in many ways a ‘discursive’ Republic (as we shall see below regarding Algeria, its first 
discursive-political challenge). ‘Utterance’ (and silence or omission – in the first years almost 
exclusively that of de Gaulle alone – and his interpretation of ‘opinion’) has major impact 
upon the political process. The media, radio, television, press conferences, speeches and 
pronouncements, and language itself, become decisive in the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle’s 
Republic was not only created by his own use of ‘persona’ and its interaction with the dying 
political days of the Fourth Republic, which we shall analyse below, it made persona, its 
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discursive performance, and its relation to opinion an essential feature of the new republic. It 
is true, as we shall see, that there was an assumption that this compelling aspect of the new 
regime would disappear when the Algerian crisis was overcome or else when de Gaulle left 
office; this was far from being the case and underscores once again how party political or 
constitutional interpretations are inadequate. The personal within the institutional 
configuration brings the discursive and rhetorical to the fore. And their often direct appeal to 
opinion ‘mobilizes’ opinion, in discourse at least and often in reality. 
 
The second and related characteristic of the new regime was that the first characteristic – the 
centrality and ‘play’ of opinion and of the personal/discursive/cultural – would render politics 
in the Fifth Republic extremely complex. Many polities can be relatively accurately described 
in a quite straightforward way: a socio-economic base upon which parties are structured and 
where politics, within the framework of a set of institutions, allocates/distributes resources, 
structures political debate, and – through parties and their interactions with opinion – creates 
cycles of political power and the possession of political office and the elaboration and 
application of policy. In Fifth Republic France, because of the unusual and dramatic nature of 
its advent and the centrality of the personal referred to above, seven elements interact 
constantly, often creating dynamic ‘rushes’ of very consequential political activity, as we 
shall see. The seven elements are: first, the institutions themselves and their configuration 
and interaction. Any analysis of politics in the Fifth Republic has to appraise the powers and 
activity of the presidency, National Assembly, Senate, Constitutional Council and so on at 
any given moment. 
 
Second, analysis needs to involve appraisal of the exalted notion of personalized leadership in 
the Fifth Republican French imagination, as well as the actual comportment of the President 
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(and later a whole range of political leaders and aspirant leaders), and the effect of character, 
personality, persona and personal initiatives upon the political process.  
 
Third, accompanying the institutionally central role of character will be a consequential series 
of discursive and rhetorical resources such as visions, envisioning, a ‘high’ rhetorical register 
about France and its history/role/destiny; and a discourse upon the relationship of political 
activity/envisioning to the ‘state’ and its health and integrity; and the role of the ‘people’, the 
‘nation’, the rally or ‘rassemblement’ (e.g. a rassemblement d’idées), the ‘electorate’, ‘la 
France profonde’, and later a series of additions to these rhetorical resources, often tied to 
other mythologies, such as ‘projets’, ‘projets de société’, ‘le changement’, other kinds of  
‘rassemblement’, ‘les forces vives’ and a continually evolving vocabulary, but, and this is the 
essential point, a vocabulary which has influence upon political developments. This elevated 
vocabulary will also have significant effect upon personal leadership, and upon France’s self 
depictions, upon interpolations of ‘grandeur’, upon political protocol and diplomatic 
protocol, and therefore upon foreign policy and France within a system of international 
relations. 
 
Fourth, ‘opinion’ in a myriad of real or imagined forms will be a major factor in the evolution 
of the political process, and in more dramatic form: strikes, demonstrations, civil disorder (or 
their memory) will take on mythic qualities, or if not mythic then psychological. French street 
demonstrations, coordinated strikes, even tipping vegetables or wine onto roads, can have 
political effects well beyond those seen in comparable countries, and in fact, normally well 
beyond the financial or strategic power of the section of the workforce or community taking 
action. Because of the personal nature of the Fifth Republic, there is wide scope for reference 
to what opinion really feels, truly wants, demands, desires, and so on. Ironically, we should 
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stress that in spite of or perhaps because of the fact that ‘opinion’ has taken on such 
significance in the Fifth Republic, it remains time and again politically unpredictable in so 
many of its manifestations. 
 
Fifth, the political parties (and other forces politiques like the trade unions) remained major 
players into the Fifth Republic, structuring its politics, its evolution, and its discourse, and in 
turn being structured and transformed by it. This irony was lost on many, though not all, 
political actors, analysts and observers, perhaps the most dramatic example being de Gaulle 
himself who overestimated the strength of the political parties and underestimated their 
mutability. 
 
Sixth, all of these interactions take place in the context of a rapidly changing society.iv 
 
Seventh, the dramatic nature of the Fifth Republic’s creation, and the political dramatization 
of self and of events by de Gaulle, became a constituent element of political life; and whether 
real or imagined or rhetorically constructed, drama becomes continual (perhaps if it became 
continuous it would cease to be drama), in perceptions, in language, and, because of the often 
discordant other six elements, in reality. In the case of the Fifth Republic one cannot 
overstate the way in which the first six elements – the political institutions (and we would 
need to add to this, the ‘given moment’ of the cycles they find themselves in), personal 
leadership, discourse, opinion, the political parties, and societal changes – interact, 
particularly at political moments such as elections (but also referenda, second-order elections, 
moments of social protest, or events telescoped into the run-off period between elections) to 
produce what we might call storms of political activity in which a series of related 
developments occur and which have deep and far reaching effects upon those involved and 
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upon the political process more generally. The events often occur in such a closely packed 
and dramatic series, that they appear to be stunningly choreographed and follow 
consequential sequences like moments of revolution.  
 
It is the interaction of the above elements in the context of a dramatic origin – the Fifth 
Republic truly began not on 28 September 1958 when it became a juridical entity but on 13 
May 1958 (with the dramatic events in Algiers then Paris) – that accords a kind of dramatic 
licence to French politics. Most observers see the referendum confirming the new republic 
(28 September 1958) as the act that domesticated the drama of 13 May. The opposite is 
equally true: the 28 September brought the drama of 13 May into the Republic. And in 
drama, performance is crucial. And de Gaulle’s was at this moment highly accomplished. 
From reading his Memoirsv, we would believe, he would have us believe, that he foresaw the 
events of 1958-1962, and/or that a teleology unfolded. In fact, de Gaulle was often either 
mistaken about or unaware of issues, e.g. the consequences of the electoral law adopted in 
1958. The apparent teleologies, however, can be explained if we bear in mind the seven 
elements constitutive of political action in the Fifth Republic that we have outlined above. So 
that, for example, between June and December 1958, de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic was 
everything that the Fourth Republic was not: dramatic where the Fourth was workaday, 
problem solving, dynamic, personalized, bold on the international stage, and as if in touch 
with the people. In essence, however, the Fifth Republic was not that dissimilar from its 
predecessor, which had itself been trying to rationalize the executive and streamline the 
political process. Both were republics (this was the first time in France’s history that there 
had been a republican sequence), the state bureaucracy remained, much of the political 
personnel, French foreign policy did not alter radically, the economy continued to grow and 
society to modernize in the same way as before. France’s alliances remained by and large the 
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same, and so on. We can say that it was in large part in appearance, style, language and 
symbolism that the differences needed to be stressed, if de Gaulle’s difference and therefore 
justification were to remain effective, and the new republic was to function. It is this that 
explains an important aspect of the character of the young Fifth Republic, and has so much 
influence upon the evolution of the republic.  
 
From this we can say that not all political legitimacy was about republican integrity on de 
Gaulle’s part, nor about his relationship to a coup (still argued), but about mythical 
legitimacy. For de Gaulle to attain and hold on to mythical legitimacy, both republican 
integrity and distance from the coup were necessary although not sufficient conditions. The 
overriding condition was for both elites and opinion to recognize the need for – and/or to 
allow – a (recognized) personal figure to restore the (fallen) state; and for a whole series of 
players to imagine the scene and their own parts, and enact their roles, or at least to stand 
back and allow those who felt they had these roles to so enact them.  
 
De Gaulle’s return to power in May 1958 (and the concept of ‘return’ was important) began, 
therefore, not only in real time but also in mythical time. This is crucial to an understanding 
of how the Fifth Republic then developed. In the context of our analysis, the immediate 
conditions of de Gaulle’s return were three: that he had been the war hero who, in 1944, had 
restored the state’s integrity from within a republican framework; that he had dramatically 
abandoned this ungrateful nation in January 1946 and had withdrawn to his home in 
Colombey; that by 1958, the state’s authority was again faltering. 
 
The Birth of the New Republic 
 24
The ‘real’ event that began the return of de Gaulle to power in 1958 was the May rising in 
Algiers.vi  Until this moment, he had either been almost forgotten or was seen as a potential 
leader but one who would probably not return to politics. A first point to note is that the event 
was characterized as much by emotion as by political/strategic calculation. Algerian 
nationalist fighters of the FLN executed three captured French soldiers. In response to this, 
one group, a comité de vigilance (which had organized a successful demonstration three 
weeks earlier), called upon the Algerian population to strike between twelve noon and 8pm, 
and to demonstrate at 5pm against the new government in Paris and its Algerian policies (at 
the same time as the National Assembly in Paris was setting up a new government to be led 
by the young and reformist MRP figure, Pierre Pflimlin). There was an assumption in Algiers 
that only a government committed to a major campaign against the FLN in the context of an 
unequivocal commitment to keeping Algeria ‘French’ was acceptable. In metropolitan France 
too, particularly among MPs, there was an overwhelming sympathy for this view. This is 
worth bearing in mind: that the aims of the Army and the Algiers crowd coincided with the 
general view. The demonstration was nevertheless ‘insurrectionary’ in as much as it hoped, 
from Algiers, to block or interfere with the nomination of a government in Paris (as it had 
continually and politically consequentially interfered for several years). Exactly how this 
would be done and to what political purpose was, however, unclear (to all). What was clear 
was the complete success of the strike call. Everything stopped: transport, cafés, cinemas, 
schools, and the university and the civil service all took action.  By early afternoon, 
thousands of people (estimated at 100,000) were converging on the centre of Algiers, 
animated by young people on motor scooters exhorting the growing crowd. A minute’s 
silence for the three dead was followed by calls for the army to take power. Government 
buildings were besieged and, after the riot police were replaced by soldiers, the demonstrators 
stormed the gates unhindered, in fact, were helped by soldiers, and proceeded to occupy the 
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government offices (throwing paper out of windows essentially, an insurrectionary gesture 
always highly symbolic of political attitudes and relationships but of no strategic interest). 
Irrespective of thirty years of right wing plots and disdain for elected politicians in the French 
military, it is worth underlining the spontaneous, almost ‘now-what-do-we-do?’ flavour of 
these events of 13 May in Algiers.  
 
In the confusion and brouhaha, the demonstrators set up a committee of public safety (Comité 
de salut public) headed by General Jacques Massu, who himself, although a hero for and 
sympathetic to the local pieds-noirs population, was acting out of a desire to control the 
turmoil, with the help of other military and civilian activists (among them some Gaullists). 
Massu telegrammed Paris urging that a similarly minded government be sworn in there. 
Comités sprang up across Algeria’s main towns, and it is worth stressing here that a kind of 
pieds-noirs/Muslim solidarity and fraternity also seemed to accelerate over the next days in a 
kind of revolutionary celebration. In Paris, by the evening, the events in Algiers had (possibly 
predictably) had the opposite effect to their intention. Many parallels have been made with 
the riotous events of 6 February 1934 in Paris,vii but one needs to stress that however 
potentially dangerous were the events in Algiers they posed no immediate danger to Paris. In 
a kind of republican, ‘étatiste’ solidarity (actually too late to stabilise the regime’s 
legitimacy), Pflimlin’s premiership/government was endorsed by an impressive 274 to 120 
against (with 137 abstentions which in Fourth Republic terms was akin to a vote in favour). 
Only that morning had the newspapers predicted that if Pflimlin won it would be by only a 
handful of votes. Pflimlin’s government endorsement came after a period of four weeks 
where, effectively, the country had had no government. The Algiers revolt was like an 
electric shock into the French body politic. The French government gave orders not to open 
fire on the demonstrators, and soon (both outgoing and incoming Prime Ministers agreed) 
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accorded civil powers to the senior General in Algiers, General Raoul Salan, already in 
possession of military powers. In terms of our subsequent appraisal of de Gaulle’s actions, 
that Salan’s authority conflated civil and military powers is crucial. Salan, moreover, had 
been urged by Massu, himself at pains to avoid accusations of outright rebellion or mutiny, to 
take overall command in Algiers. Many commentators have quite rightly commented that 
Paris’ recognition of General Salan, and therefore a certain complicity after-the-fact with the 
Algiers events, was simply realistic: he already held the power, and therefore could help stop 
an escalation into a military coup (most of the French army was in Algeria at this time) or 
even a civil war. All of this is true. As regards legitimacy, however, the ambivalence of 
attitude by Paris would simply find a certain echo in de Gaulle’s failure to condemn. The 
following day, 14 May, there was a kind of stand off, with the massively endorsed Pflimlin 
forming his government. The government reached from Mollet and the tough-minded 
Socialist Jules Moch (who had faced down the Communists and Unions in 1947) across to 
Gaullists and the strong Algérie Française supporter, Georges Bidault. The problem for this, 
perhaps the strongest government of the Fourth Republic, was to know what to do. 
 
There were two other ‘actors’ in the frame: de Gaulle himself, and public opinion, and the 
actions and reactions of these would also be decisive in a situation where the Algiers 
demonstrators were reluctant to embrace a Franquist putsch if they could still enjoy even tacit 
approval or acceptance, however reluctant (in the form even of silence), from Paris. Early on 
the 14 May, the President appealed to the Army to remain under the authority of the 
Republic. Interpretations of legitimacy, therefore, could still at this time be ‘stretched’ by the 
actors involved. The government too did not want to provoke the army, but had a very 
unclear view of how much authority it itself possessed. What both sides (Algiers and Paris) 
needed was for the other side to act the way it wanted so that it did not need to act itself. 
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Time itself, therefore, was the worst enemy of each as its passing demonstrated that neither 
side was taking the initiative. Into this almost freeze frame stepped de Gaulle on the 
following day. We shall come back to the true nature and significance of de Gaulle’s actions 
below but should stress here that the condition of de Gaulle’s initiative was the (true or 
apparent) moment of inaction of the 14 May by both sides. And inaction (true or apparent) by 
others was essential to de Gaulle’s fortunes.  
 
Before looking at de Gaulle we should stress that ‘public opinion’, the other ‘actor’ in France 
over this whole affair (Algeria, the fall of the Fourth Republic, the return of de Gaulle) was 
an enigma. It seemed rather unconcerned with the events (the war in Algeria had been going 
on for four years); holiday weekend plans went ahead, there had been few demonstrations 
outside trade union demonstrations for some years, no groups were pouring on to the streets; 
confidence in ‘the system’ and in politicians was very low, but few expected ever to see de 
Gaulle again, who was becoming a memory for many of the French, indeed for some not 
even a memory. Newspapers on the 14th expressed attitudes that ranged from seeing the 
events in Algiers as a coup, to seeing them as a passing protest, to stressing the huge 
confidence placed in Pflimlin by MPs, to (very few) calls for de Gaulle’s return. The media 
coverage was wide ranging yet was beginning to canalize opinion, making it more aware that, 
whatever it was, something dramatic seemed, this time, to be happening. It is also worth 
mentioning here that ‘opinion’ was quiet partly because although having little faith in the 
Fourth Republic, it was, right across the spectrum, overwhelmingly in favour of keeping 
Algeria French, from the die-hards to those who simply did not want to abandon a people 
heartlessly. Into this strange scene where none of the actors – Army, Government, Opinion – 
were mobilizing, stepped de Gaulle. We can say outright, therefore, that whatever may have 
happened subsequently, his own initiative was the product of nothing at all but his own 
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personal gamble, and was initially a series of initiatives (almost exclusively discursive) that 
had no substance to them at all, and relied utterly on the perceptions of others (of each other 
and of him), and upon the inaction of others who, like bystanders or a theatre audience, 
watched him perform.  
 
On the 15 May, Salan,viii recognized as the only authority by the mushrooming Committees 
of Public Safety, and as the legitimate voice of Paris in Algiers, finished a speech to the 
crowd with the words ‘Vive de Gaulle!’. It is clear that a lot of demonstrators saw de Gaulle 
as their best or only or only legitimate way of attaining their aims, even though many pieds-
noirs disliked de Gaulle, regarding him as a liberal. This included Salan. It is also true that a 
tiny group of conspiratorial de Gaulle supporters in Algiers were working overtime, and 
possibly even prompted Salan to utter these words. 
 
Salan’s call echoed a certain shift towards de Gaulle in French public opinion, in the Army, 
in the Algerian population/s and by a growing trickle of party politicians. We have here the 
first and a classic illustration of de Gaulle’s significance: that different and opposing groups 
could see in him, some through devotion, respect or allegiance, others through cooler 
appraisal, the person who could help them achieve their aims or solve their problems. It is 
clear that in such a situation, de Gaulle had to respond, both by what he said and what he did 
not say. At five o’ clock on 15th de Gaulle put out a press release, his first significant public 
intervention in politics in three years. He commented, in fewer than one hundred words, that 
the state had faltered, the people were alienated, the army was in turmoil, and that the country 
had lost its independence. He added that the political parties were unable to stop the slide to 
disaster, and that the country had once put its trust in him. As the country once again was 
threatened, he was ready to assume the powers of the Republic: 
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‘La dégradation de l’Etat entraîne infallibliblement l’éloignement des peuples associés, le 
trouble de l’armée au combat, la dislocation nationale, la perte de l’indépendance. Depuis 
douze ans, la France aux prises avec des problèmes trop rudes pour le régime des partis, est 
engagée dans ce processus désastreux. 
Naguère le pays, dans ses profondeurs, m’a fait confiance pour le conduire tout entier jusqu’à 
son salut. 
Aujourd’hui, devant les épreuves qui montent de nouveau vers lui, qu’il sache que je me tiens 
prêt à assumer les pouvoirs de la République’.ix 
 
Four things are worth mentioning here about this crucial ‘moment’: de Gaulle makes no 
specific reference to Algiers, therefore leaving it and his reaction to it open to interpretation; 
he identifies everything as a symptom of the troubles (even the parties are not a cause but are 
simply inadequate); he puts the exclusive focus upon himself as the only solution; and he 
declares his willingness to ‘assume’ republican power (there is ambivalence as to who is to 
give him this power and authority – the candidates being the people, the public authorities but 
also almost destiny itself), but the Republic he will inherit, not (yet) overthrow.x 
 
The effect of de Gaulle’s declaration was to offer a solution in the form of himself being 
brought centre stage. The situation now involved not just the power of the army but the 
legitimacy of de Gaulle, so that the site of possible legitimacy now involved three places: 
Algiers, Paris and Colombey. The reaction of the parties in Parliament was to strengthen for a 
time their support for Pflimlin by condemning de Gaulle’s intervention, in particular for his 
failure to condemn the actions of 13 May. We can say here that de Gaulle was adding his 
‘site’ to the duality Paris/Algiers, the latter already (however coercively) acceded to by Paris. 
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The condemnation of de Gaulle’s not condemning Algiers therefore added to de Gaulle’s 
authority by implicitly urging him to take on, as it were, ‘Paris’s’ status. And Paris’ own 
condemnations of Algiers had been extremely equivocal. Much more importantly, de Gaulle 
had placed his own ‘site’ (Colombey) symbolically between Paris and Algiers.  There were to 
be two more weeks of this gavotte. 
 
De Gaulle’s ‘I am ready’ communiqué of 15 May indicates how, rhetorically, he enters the 
Paris/Algiers relationship. The immediate effect however was to strengthen opposition to him 
among politicians, in fact to reverse the developing change in their attitudes. On Friday 16, 
the first to engage de Gaulle in discussion in order to domesticate the Gaullist threat, and 
perhaps profit from it, even use it to the Republic’s advantage, was Guy Mollet, perhaps the 
key figure of the Fourth Republic in the ultimate transfer of power to de Gaulle – for several 
reasons. As both vice-premier and leader of the Socialist Party (SFIO), he asked de Gaulle 
(via answers to journalists and – significantly in terms of the developing rhetorical matrix of 
May-June 1958 – without consulting his Prime Minister): did de Gaulle recognise the 
legitimacy of the Pflimlin government? Would he condemn the Algiers insurrection? And 
would he, if he, de Gaulle, were himself appointed Prime Minister, observe republican 
conventions? Such questions clearly constrained de Gaulle in terms of containing him within 
the Fourth Republic’s legality, but the logic of Mollet’s questions brought dramatically into 
the discursive framework the idea that if de Gaulle passed these tests, fundamentally of his 
own legitimacy within the Republic, then he (in discourse) became eligible for leadership of 
France (in reality). xi  
 
De Gaulle’s response was to maximize his own symbolic significance, in that he did not 
answer Mollet’s questions, but stated that he would hold a press conference the following 
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Monday, the evening of the 19 May. A weekend of deferred anticipation followed, and on the 
19th, in front of the national and international press, with thousands of police and gendarmerie 
on the streets, limousines arriving and camera bulbs flashing, and in the context of 
demonstrations and actions by the Communists and the Unions (e.g. cutting electrical supply 
in the metro), de Gaulle arrived at the press conference. By announcing but deferring his 
press conference de Gaulle had slowed down the pace of the dramatic unfolding of events, 
while making the protagonists (Paris and Algiers) critically dependent upon his awaited 
words (and we have already stated that neither Paris nor Algiers, the first to hide its 
impotence, the second to hide its aggression, enjoyed or profited from the passing of time 
itself). He also did the opposite, that is – while bringing himself centre stage – speeded up 
discussion, debate, activity, and speculation to an extreme level, thus transforming the 
conditions of subsequent events. We have seen how opinion was still not politically 
mobilized, but it is worth noting that in this two week period sales of portable transistor 
radios quadrupled.xii  
 
At the press conference, a fundamental shift takes place in that de Gaulle’s style as well as 
what he says (and does not say) become crucially important. It is also worth remembering 
(essentially via photos, journalists’ descriptions and newsreels) how de Gaulle looked would 
be consequential. Many had not seen him for years. In 1958 (compared to January 1946), de 
Gaulle was a significantly older and more portly man, here in civvies (he would soon wear 
military uniform when visiting Algeria), and he used humour, generosity (towards Mollet and 
others), and a sense of care and concern that are crucial to understanding the unfolding 
events. Given, especially over the weekend, the PCF’s depiction of him as dangerous, and a 
generalized concern about de Gaulle’s anti-republican and monarchical comportment, his 
style and friendliness (he was rarely to be so relaxed in his many subsequent press 
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conferences – arguably not until between the two rounds in 1965) had a dramatically relaxing 
effect. The prevailing virtual notion of violence pervading the events of the previous week 
was transformed into ease and friendly exchange. This was the press conference where he 
asked, to much shared amusement, whether people really thought that at 67 he was going to 
start a career as a dictator.xiii What is significant and rarely commented on is that the question 
was not only humorous but rhetorical – the answer could only really be an embarrassed one 
of – of course we never thought that, or else laughter. 
 
 As regards answering Mollet’s other questions about his republican probity, first, de Gaulle 
was able to make reference to his republican integrity both as France’s liberator but also as 
premier of one of its most reformist republican governments, where he had observed legality 
and convention between 1944 and 1946. In so doing, de Gaulle was not only justifying 
himself, he was focusing upon himself as France’s hero. He acknowledged the concerns of 
the military without condemning them. We shall come back to this, but can say here that this 
defence here was, crucially, to stress that the government itself had not condemned outright 
the military insubordination and its alliance with the civil disobedience. De Gaulle’s 
demeanour, moreover, was such that he was behaving as the equal – at least – of the 
government itself. This conference was a didactic, highly publicized lesson to government by 
an individual in Paris who was not himself in government. This kind of thing had never 
happened in French history. De Gaulle again portrayed the Algiers events as a symptom 
rather than cause, stressing that the defect lay in the institutions, that the country’s trials all 
flowed from that. Having put the focus upon himself, his achievements and his views, he then 
stated that he would go back to his village and wait for ‘the country’ to come and get him (in 
so doing also stressing again this new and alternative reconciliatory site of political authority, 
his home, Colombey-les-deux-églises).xiv 
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Two contradictory consequences flowed from de Gaulle’s press conference and the rhetorical 
and symbolic insertion of de Gaulle into the developing equation, such contradiction 
illustrating the bewildering complexity of unfolding events. The first was the further 
legitimation of de Gaulle. We should remember that, given his ‘I am ready’ communiqué of 
the 15th, Parliament had reacted very strongly against him (and therefore could not simply 
change its institutional attitude). What happened were personal responses to his press 
conference persona of the 19th, a series of reactions by significant political leaders, across the 
board – who came out in support of him, by letter or in the press, or by engaging in meetings 
and discussions with him or with one another, thus creating massive impetus to his legitimacy 
– first Bidault, then Pinay, then Mollet, and so on, until all the major figures of the political 
elite of the Fourth Republic who would then transform their own parties’ approaches, came 
out publicly in favour of him. This was not universal; some significant figures opposed him, 
in particular Pierre Mendès France and François Mitterrand; and the parties themselves split, 
but for the most part in favour of de Gaulle a week or so later.  
 
The second and less commented upon consequence of de Gaulle’s semi-legitimation was to 
radicalize activity in Algiers (and thereby threaten to further de-legitimize government 
inaction). De Gaulle’s devoted supporter and Algiers hero, and former Governor of Algeria, 
Jacques Soustelle (escaping house arrest in Paris) returned to Algiers to wild welcome (on the 
17th). The Army seemed now to be in open insubordination, and it was now less likely that 
the army and police would obey the legitimate government. It had also become clear that it 
and the Algiers comités would obey de Gaulle. Soustelle was like an ambassador for de 
Gaulle. The movement of allegiance to de Gaulle by Algiers was triggered in part by Paris’ 
according him potential legitimacy. The consequence of de Gaulle’s becoming potentially the 
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central player was that he too now faced the problem, previously only faced by Paris and 
Algiers, namely time itself which would strip him of his advantageous ambivalence if events 
in Algiers accelerated, and in Paris did not, pushing him towards sedition. And they did 
accelerate.  
 
The following Saturday, after several days of de Gaulle’s receiving and talking to people like 
Pinay, the Algiers movement was transformed into overt military action as contingents of 
parachutists based in Algiers invaded and occupied Corsica with, apart from some very 
limited symbolic republican resistance, no significant resistance whatsoever, from the 
authorities, the police, the CRS, or the population. It seemed as if the semi-secret operation 
‘Résurrection’, a complete military takeover, was underway. The government in Paris began 
to take some action: press censorship, moving against MPs who seemed to be involved, and 
long-awaited constitutional revision in order to set up mechanisms that would strengthen 
government in times of crisis. In a sense, countering a military coup with constitutional 
revision was a clear demonstration of the utter ineffectiveness of the government. Late in the 
night of Monday 26, de Gaulle and Pflimlin met to discuss the situation. There is 
disagreement as to whether the principal instigator was Pflimlin trying to get de Gaulle to 
denounce the coup, or de Gaulle’s simply bullying Pflimlin to stand aside. What is significant 
is that de Gaulle’s refusal to denounce is understandable both strategically (the threat of a 
coup was bringing the Republic down) but also mythically – he had to maintain his symbolic 
position as observing the coup as a symptom of the Republic’s malaise. De Gaulle could do 
no more without either supporting the coup or abandoning his strategic and symbolic 
advantage by rallying to the defence of the republic he detested. The government seemed to 
have confirmed both its own powerlessness and his centrality. He too, however, had run out 
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of (his own invented) time, and therefore would soon face the choice of becoming a Fourth 
Republic politician or a putschist.  
 
What he did, once again, was to perform an act of discourse that, once again, had no base at 
all in the reality of power, but mercifully for him, did in the perceptions of all the other actors 
involved. He simply publicly pretended, after having left his stalemate meeting with Pflimlin, 
that he was in complete political command, whereas he was not in command of anything at 
all (except perhaps via some of his wilder conspirator lieutenants such as Delbeque a 
potentially catastrophic coup attempt). He pretended the opposite: that he commanded 
republican legitimacy. On the morning of the 27 May, that is soon after leaving Pflimlin, de 
Gaulle put out a communiqué saying that he had the day before begun the process of setting 
up a republican government, that any threat to public order would threaten this, and that all 
armed forces should show exemplary behaviour and obey their superiors, who he named, 
including Salan. The tone of the press release was as remarkable as its contents: 
 
‘J’ai entamé hier le processus régulier nécessaire à l’établissement d’un gouvernement 
républicain, capable d’assurer l’unité et l’indépendance du pays.  
Je compte que ce processus va se poursuivre et que le pays fera voir, par son calme et sa 
dignité, qu’il souhaite le voir aboutir.  
Dans ces conditions, toute action de quelque côté qu’elle vienne, qui met en cause l’ordre 
public, risque d’avoir de graves conséquences. Tout en faisant la part des circonstances, je ne 
saurais l’approuver. 
J’attends des forces terrestres, navales et aériennes présentes en Algérie, qu’elles demeurent 
exemplaires sous les ordres de leurs chefs : le général Salan, l’amiral Auboyneau, le général 
Jouhaud. 
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A ces chefs j’exprime ma confiance et mon intention de prendre contact avec eux.’xv  
 
It was as if he were the commander in chief of the army and the symbolic Head of State and 
of government. This symbolic self-depiction would become a national perception once his 
own self-legitimizing had been transferred to the level of the whole polity. In terms of the 
text’s content, it was republican, yet responded, for the first time, to the army, as if telling it 
to ‘stand down’. This was all the more impressive given that he had no power in either camp. 
Once again, the politicians reacted against de Gaulle. The socialists voted a motion of 112 to 
3 against him. Such reactions again increased not his immediate legitimacy but his symbolic 
presence. All the left wing organizations followed suit, and on the next day, Wednesday, a 
rally of between a quarter and half a million marched in Paris against the putschists. For 
some, though not all, it was also a demonstration against de Gaulle. In terms of the emerging 
pattern of ‘moves’ in this series of events, what is odd is that, at this moment, each of the 
putschists’ moves was intended (as a political solution) to bring de Gaulle, and not the army, 
to power; each of the government and politicians’ moves was a gesture of support for 
Pflimlin, for blocking de Gaulle (but with de Gaulle in their minds), and for the initiation of 
reforms, none of which had any real backing. Each of de Gaulle’s moves was made in a 
vacuum of authority and power; and now the ‘crowd’s’ moves were formidable yet 
ambivalent. No one’s plan to overcome the crisis, even de Gaulle’s, were clear and concerted; 
each was a gesture that provoked each other actor to react in some way while nothing actually 
happened. And the vacation of power was increased on the same day as the demonstration 
against the putschists because Pflimlin resigned along with his whole government. 
 
 De Gaulle met in secret, this time with the Presidents of the Assembly and Senate but, as 
with Pflimlin, there was no outcome. The following day, as the result of one act, the Fourth 
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Republic fell, or rather fell into de Gaulle’s lap. Its President, René Coty, who now had no 
Prime Minister and no government, was free to take a crisis initiative. He decided to call de 
Gaulle himself to be appointed as Prime Minister and form a government. He threatened to 
resign if this did not happen. De Gaulle of course accepted, and proceeded in an utterly 
Fourth Republic manner to meet all the party leaders (except the communists) and establish a 
government that included all the party bigwigs, appointing Mollet, Pinay, Pflimlin and others, 
and not appointing Soustelle (at this point – and when he did, not for long).xvi  
 
On Sunday 1 June de Gaulle was voted in as Prime Minister by 329 against 224 (36 
abstentions). All the parties of the right voted for, those of the centre (Radicals, MRP, UDSR) 
voted in majority for, the socialists split down the middle, and the PCF voted against. To 
have turned an almost totally hostile political class into a largely sympathetic one in the space 
of a week was astonishing. And over the next three days with three more majority votes, de 
Gaulle got everything he had (ever) wanted: special powers to deal with the Algerian crisis, 
the right to rule by decree on all but the most fundamental rights and liberties (and electoral 
law) for a period of six months, and the right to draw up a new constitution. How had all this 
been possible? If we can answer that question it will help us understand the nature of the 
republic that was coming into being. 
 
Understanding The New Republic 
France in 1958 was a rapidly changing society. Based upon an economic boom that had been 
going on for over ten years (and would continue for nearly another twenty, although it is true 
that 1958 was not without economic difficulties),xvii the late 1950s were witness to rapid 
social and economic change. This socially, culturally and economically rich context was the 
paradoxical setting for a government in paralysis and under threat of a military coup, and 
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even civil war. Even if the government had had more grip on itself and on political power, it 
was extremely uncertain whether it would have the support of the police, gendarmerie, and 
CRS, if the situation exploded, let alone the army, which was threatening to invade its own 
mainland. What is significant for our purposes, is how symbolic politics and rhetoric filled 
the political space and gave a dynamism and outcome to four dramatic weeks in which, apart 
from symbolism, gesture, and discourse, nothing really happened; and yet the language and 
‘grammar’ of this dramatic symbolic politics seemed to be understood by all the actors 
involved, even though no one knew the true significance of what any one actor was doing or 
saying. It was as if everyone understood the language but had different interpretations of the 
specific gestures and utterances. 
 
 The Algiers events seemed immediately readable – once again, force was being used to 
move against a weak regime. The nearest parallel seemed to be 6 February 1934. In this case 
of course, the Mediterranean would have to be crossed, although this too almost happened. In 
many ways, however, the Algiers events evoked left-wing traditions too: the Comité de salut 
public had echoes of 1793 and a lot of the commotion and declarations were reminiscent of 
1789; the fraternizing of the crowds in Algiers and other Algerian cities between Europeans 
but also between Europeans and Muslims, and especially between the ‘crowd’ and the 
soldiers, the sporadic outbreaks of joy, and the sense of celebration, were reminiscent of 
French revolutionary tradition. The declarations and appeals (the ‘appel’ is a very French and 
dramatic political form of address cf. de Gaulle, 18 June 1940) of the main players like 
Massu and Salan demonstrate acute historical awareness. The invasion of Corsica was 
strategic, cautionary, but also highly symbolic, and ‘liberationist’ – Corsica had been a 
springboard of the liberation of France in 1944 from Nazi rule. 
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A further element of the grammar that all actors shared and which played a major role in both 
thinking and outcome, was the idea of ‘unity’ (‘unité’, ‘unicité’ etc) that pervades French 
political thinking. Colonial thought based upon difference and racism is not part of this; but a 
strong part of Algérie Française thought was arguably not racist, in fact, was high-minded 
(and perhaps unrealistic): and the joyous fraternization that went on through May 1958 attests 
to a desire for a kind of transcendence of difference. This desire for unity informed all of the 
actors: the army, the party politicians even in moments of deep crisis; and de Gaulle’s 
political philosophy was based upon the partly Thomist idea that unity is the constantly to be 
striven for prerequisite to greatness and happiness. And the Rousseauist notion of an all-
embracing General Will underpins French republicanism – distinguishing it from other forms 
of democracy. In many ways, this is where legitimacy lies in the French political imagination, 
and this in all ideologies; and if one bears this in mind, we can see that a great deal of the 
manoeuvring, the claims, the mises en garde, the reassurances, and so on made by each and 
all between 13 May and 1 June are actually about unity as opposed to division, or rather 
claims to legitimacy in the name of unity. Each actor used ‘unity’ and ‘division’ to define 
themselves and their opponents and gain symbolic advantage in relation to this mythical 
notion. In de Gaulle’s thought the emphasis is upon the state, but even this is in order that 
France be maintained and prosper as a near-sacred unified entity. 
 
This was the aim: that effective politics was to be the expression of an all embracing mythical 
national unity. The question was how to do it in the context of the division of France into two 
political camps: military/colons dissent v. Parisian political legitimacy. The representatives of 
the former were almost illegal but not quite totally; the latter almost incapable of action and 
without authority. De Gaulle’s success would depend upon his being seen to reconcile the 
two without becoming one or the other. To do this, he had to maintain the coup as part of that 
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which had to be transcended, and to do this he had to ensure that it remained in the public’s 
imagination a symptom of a sickness created not by the French tradition of virulent 
nationalism, but by the absence of the true legitimacy of the political institutions. And having 
true legitimacy would depend upon the leader’s relation to ‘the people’ (in some form) on the 
one hand, and to ‘France’ on the other. De Gaulle was therefore not a republican in the 
classic or received sense, but was no less committed to the Republic for that, in that 
republicanism, the overwhelming choice of the French at this moment of history, was 
necessary to his being on the side of unity. And it is this personally envisioned notion of unity 
that would inform the republic henceforth and become the essential condition of its strength. 
We can add that this is an extraordinary political phenomenon – a person who, in a crisis, 
refuses to condemn or endorse either side (almost an imperative in crises) and who posits 
himself as the transcendent site of legitimacy. This will become the true source of legitimacy 
of the new republic. 
 
In the almost empty space opened up to symbolic politics in May 1958, rhetoric became 
crucially important, and then a major feature of the new republic. It is the discourse and 
rhetoric of individuals, echoing, interpolating, bringing onto the scene, the mythologies of 
unity, greatness, strength, happiness, extraordinary and exemplary leadership, and so on, in 
dramatic and arresting ways, that become, in part, the currency of the new republic. 
 
For de Gaulle to claim supreme legitimacy and provoke reaction in this empty space of 
inaction, meant making rhetorical interventions in the hope that, recognized as significant in 
the mythologies informing French politics, others would react in particular ways so that these 
would indeed inform politics. It is essential to our understanding to recognize that these were 
all discursive gambles de Gaulle made, and depended upon the shared mythological grammar 
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in the first instance, and upon people reacting to them, in the second. De Gaulle knew better 
than anyone that the army, the press, the government, and the public’s failure to respond to 
him (negatively or positively) would leave his initiatives lettre morte. 
 
 It is a truism in history and political science that ‘what ifs’ have no currency in analysis, but 
even though not anything could happen in 1958, nothing was determined. It is not to 
speculate fruitlessly to mention but a few things that could have happened or not happened; 
and this not to know what might have happened but in order to underscore the contingency of 
what did happen. There was no finality to Massu’s having become the figurehead of the 
rebellion, for example, and if he had not, things would almost certainly have developed 
differently. Similarly, if he had not in turn called on Salan to take on the overall leadership of 
the rebellion, or Salan had refused, or Paris had disowned him, things would have developed 
differently; or if de Gaulle had felt his 67 years more heavily, or if de Gaulle had denounced 
the rebellion, or identified more closely with it, or if Mollet had not asked his questions of de 
Gaulle or had not been persuaded by de Gaulle, or if Coty had not decided to facilitate de 
Gaulle’s accession to power; if de Gaulle’s press conference had been a less masterly 
performance, and so on, then things would have developed differently. What each of these 
semi-counterfactuals shares is that each involved nodal actions by individuals. And it was the 
myriad individual actions which were so consequential. None more so that de Gaulle’s three 
(discursive) interventions: the communiqué of 15 May, the press conference of 19 May, and 
the communiqué of 27 May. Let us look at these three crucial discursive acts again, for a 
moment. They have generally been recognized in the literature as crucial. Rémond as well as 
Berstein and Milza note that what was remarkable about them was that they were each simply 
discursive interventions: a first press release, a press conference, and a second press 
release.xviii What has not been stressed is the nature of the discursive interventions and their 
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consequences. The first and last were simply communiqués, press releases, but ones that had 
the tone of the leader, the last communiqué especially had the tone of someone already in 
power, like the pronouncement of a President or king giving orders to the political class, the 
people, and the army. These framed the perceived character of de Gaulle, but they remained 
just that, frames in which his authoritative ‘character’ was portrayed. We should add that both 
communiqués triggered the ire of the political class, particularly the National Assembly and 
most of the political parties. The alternative, however, would have been his irrelevance. It is 
also the case that the ire was, in large part, from those who wanted him to denounce the 
rebellion, but by demanding that he do so, legitimated him, ascribing to him power over the 
rebellion, and a potential republican legitimacy. 
 
 The truly consequential discursive intervention, however, was de Gaulle’s press conference 
of 19 May. We have to understand it as a performance. The contexts of the performance were 
four: 1) that de Gaulle had almost been forgotten by the public and was being dramatically 
reintroduced into the public’s imagination;xix 2) even physically his appearance was novel – 
he was older and greyer than he was remembered. He had withdrawn almost totally from the 
public’s view certainly for three years, but for many the memory of de Gaulle was of 1944-
1946, and to a lesser extent of the creation of the RPF in 1947; 3) the received view of de 
Gaulle was that he was aloof, austere, unsmiling, monarchical, indeed old fashioned by 1958 
standards, and his somewhat frightening image had recently been confirmed by the first 
communiqué, and had been continually stressed throughout the Fourth Republic by the 
opponents of personal power; 4) the events of the previous week and the calling of a press 
conference themselves conferred upon de Gaulle enormous significance, as well as injecting 
further drama into the series of events. These made up the context. The performance itself 
brought the question of perceived character decisively into the (beginnings of) the Fifth 
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Republic; for de Gaulle was not at all as people expected him to be: he was relaxed, urbane, 
generous, spirited, funny, and responsive, and this was the persona that the French and the 
political class, and the military, and the national and the international mediaxx saw and heard 
(on newsreels, on radio and in papers and in magazines, and through personal exchanges and 
hearsay). It was this new aspect of character, this new persona, that accompanied, replaced, 
vied with, complemented as it were, the high-minded aloof character that would have himself 
the incarnation of France itself. The ambivalence associated with character and with 
discourse, and the performance of persona, brought so consequentially into the mainframe of 
politics, would play a central role here, in the aftermath, and then throughout the Fifth 
Republic. 
 
The near totality of political debate about de Gaulle in 1958 and subsequently has revolved 
around four ambivalences: was he involved more than he ever admitted in the 13 May rising 
and its aftermath (even the possible coup against the Republic, ‘Opération Résurrection’)?; 
was he always going to give Algeria independence?; was his Republic in the true tradition of 
republicanism or was it a distortion of it?; where does or should power and authority truly lie 
in the Fifth Republic? All of these questions are necessary and their answers informative of 
the nature of 1958 and the Republic (although none of them has ever been answered with 
clarity). What these debates have ignored is the new political significance of ambivalence and 
ambiguity themselves, for in all four cases the answers need to include the fact that de 
Gaulle’s ambivalence had major effects: upon the coup, upon developments in Algeria, upon 
the nature of republicanism, and the nature of power in the republic. Ambivalence feeds into 
the political process at the founding moment and then at every moment. Ambivalence and 
ambiguity do not just lie in the actor or spectator, they lie in the language itself: this is in part 
why de Gaulle could be all things to all people; and the register he used quite naturally 
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involves striking, yet ambivalent, concepts: France, greatness, the nation, and so on, but even 
apparently more straightforward terms such as Republic are rich in ambiguity. Add to this the 
desire on the part of a listener, member of the public, party leader, putschist etc that he mean 
something they wish to hear (or might mean something that they do not), and ambiguity, 
paradoxically, is added to by listener expectation that would have it reduced. The 
ambivalence or polyvalence of intention, accident, of language itself, and of listener 
reception, all are made more consequential by the emphasis that was put, during the drama of 
1958, upon what individuals said, should have said or did not say. We should remember the 
formative role not just of words but of silence too, again, de Gaulle’s case being the most 
important. Williams refers to his silences at this time as ‘delphic’.xxi De Gaulle himself as 
early as 1932 in his writings on leadership xxii had stressed the importance of silence. In terms 
of his persona, his not condemning the Algiers rising was significant, but more so was that he 
had been silent (more or less) for a decade, so that his stepping back into the (discursive) 
arena and performing so (rhetorically) dramatically meant that a communiqué, a press 
conference, would confer upon him the image of a returning saviour (or that of a fool if 
circumstances had been different). We can add on the question of character that – to the 
extent that it is ever truly known to observers – actual character will also become significant: 
de Gaulle’s pessimism, his overblown view of himself, his depressions, his coolness towards 
even those who devoted themselves to him, his ingratitude, his higher calling, and so on also 
play into the early Republic informing the nature of executive authority.xxiii 
 
We can make two observations. The first is that for the early Fifth Republic, a series of 
extremely important factors other than institutional and constitutional change have critical 
influence: a sense of drama, the role of exceptional individuals, a sense of the complexity of 
politics, ‘crisis’ as a political concept, the mainstream role and ‘foregrounding’ of myths 
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about France, an emphasis upon unity, the role of rhetoric and political image, and the 
imagined relationships between things and people; all these will be formative, and 
understanding the republic will be dependent upon their analysis.  
 
The second observation is that de Gaulle could only have succeeded in a polity and political 
culture in which he and the things he believed in were recognised and understood as existing 
by others – or these latter could at least be persuaded of the existence of these things, whether 
they be in the military, the political class, or the general population: that is to say, a polity 
that subscribes to the notion that the state needs to be united to be strong, that exceptional 
individuals exist and can change history, that the notions of Gaullism had a currency in 
French political culture. It was these parts of the culture – in the name of democracy – that 
the Fourth Republic had pushed to the margins; in a sense, even the Fourth Republic itself 
‘recognized’ de Gaulle, not as a has-been but as its own antithesis, so that when he re-entered 
the public political arena, it immediately – negatively and positively – responded to him, both 
in the context of Algiers, and in the context of its own paralysis, thus beginning a process 
which over just a three-week period handed him the possibility of changing the regime.  
 
Two related phenomena must be taken into consideration in any appraisal, and seen as 
significantly informative: a relative social stability and economic expansion, on the one hand, 
and the role of opinion on the other. Stability and expansion are usually seen as an 
infrastructure that ‘explains’ the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic (e.g. a new 
part of the Resistance elite fulfilling the same socio-economic function, i.e. modernization).  
This is not wrong, but to compare the socio-economic and the political in this way explains 
very little. What this wrong view does, however, is provide us with a very interesting 
question, namely, what was the relationship between de Gaulle and his context? We can say 
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that social stability and economic expansion do in fact set a stage for de Gaulle. Unlike other 
regime changes in France, there had been no economic collapse, no war, no massive 
dislocation, no famine etc.  The opposite was true and set the limits of that ‘stage’ and 
performance, but facilitated it too, that is to say that economic stability allowed for instability 
in politics, and increased the political system’s ‘tolerance’ of individual performance, 
allowing it to claim that it stabilized rather than destabilized democracy and the regime. This 
aspect of the Fifth Republic has continued up to the present day.   
 
The second and related aspect of this is that it brings ‘opinion’ in as a key player.xxiv  Here 
‘public opinion’ and surveys can be real, scientific, and so on, but they are still just a version 
of ‘opinion’ playing a significant role. ‘Public opinion’ with or without inverted commas may 
be ‘real’, may exist in society or as an object in and of discourse, or both, and inform politics. 
We are interested in how the ‘informing’ informs the politics. For example, as we have noted, 
commentators often refer to public opinion as late as January 1958 assuming de Gaulle would 
never return to power. How are we to appraise the value of public opinion if it can change so 
rapidly? What does it mean for our understanding of opinion if it can go from near ignorance 
to devotional followership in a few months? What is the value of de Gaulle’s relationship to 
the French if he can be acclaimed so soon after being ignored? What should we think? 
Perhaps ‘opinion’ can step on to the stage where a stage is there for it to step on to, and then 
it, and de Gaulle, perform. Perhaps the ‘stage’ must be discursively created before it can be 
‘real’. This means that three things happen: the first is that the politics of drama, the politics 
of ‘the sudden and unexpected’ (although ‘recognized’) becomes politically significant.xxv  
The imagining of alternative (previously imagined) politics has increased salience. The 
‘unexpected’ moves into a more privileged relationship to the institutional political process, 
and takes on a more active role, and will become the foundation for politics in the post-1958 
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republic. Second, given the ‘January polls’ idea – that de Gaulle was expected never to return 
– the notion of inevitability actually becomes absurd, or else in the French case we need to 
include the unexpected in any definition of the inevitable. Third, a further consequence is that 
all the actors – the Army, the communists, individuals, activist groups, the Algerian crowds, 
and participants and observers (‘opinion’, the electorate, the media) start to ‘live’ politics as 
drama. 
 
The overall result of this was to alter the nature of political legitimacy in the closing months 
of the Fourth Republic and the opening months of the Fifth Republic.  In a great deal of 
literature on 1958 – and this becomes the standard for analysis of the Fifth Republic from 
then onwards – there is great emphasis upon understanding the juxtaposition of the 
parliamentary and the presidential, and on a wider scale, republicanism and personalism or 
personal leadership.  These preoccupations have often masked the truly interesting point 
about the events of 1958 and their aftermath, namely the evolving nature of French political 
legitimacy. It remains within republicanism generally, but its modalities are fundamentally 
altered. The dramatically heightened level at which political relationships are imagined and 
enacted through symbolic politics is carried into the new republic.  
 
The Characteristics of the New Republic 
 
The regime became other than some if its architects had assumed because of the way de 
Gaulle (mis)interpreted his own constitution, often, in fact, ignoring it, ‘inventing’ the 
presidency after he had taken office.xxvi This is something of a puzzle: that the architect of a 
constitution would treat the constitutional settlement he had striven for, for almost twenty 
years, with a cavalier attitude, so that it took on new characteristics. The answer lies in the 
constitution’s introduction, that is to say that Algeria and the collapse of the Fourth Republic 
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provided a dramatic context in which the persona now in the frame would have relative 
freedom of action that would have far-reaching constitutional and political consequences. We 
could almost argue that the constitution and its elaboration became but a moment of a much 
more wide-ranging process which elaborated simultaneously an unwritten constitution based 
upon de Gaulle’s comportment. We shall analyse the reasons for this below, but can say that 
procedurally also the constitution was part of a dynamic and dramatic process. On 2 June de 
Gaulle had the special powers (voted since 1956 to the Prime Minister) to try to deal with the 
Algerian crisis, new full powers for six months, and the go-ahead for a government-led 
constitutional law to be ratified by referendum.  
 
De Gaulle maintained an enigmatic distance from his own constitution. It is equally the case 
that his distance from everything was an imperative. This often excruciating aspect of de 
Gaulle’s – we can say real – personality all his active life was crucial to the development of 
the regime. Distance from the political parties, from constitutional obedience as we have 
mentioned, but also from the army, from the media (very formal press conferences/ 
broadcasts), distance from the political activists of Algeria, and, as we shall see, from his own 
Gaullist supporters. These latter, however, are a key: his distance is both real and apparent, 
that is to say that his own ‘army’ of support had to act utterly in accordance with his views in 
order that he could behave as if he were not in any relation to them, or to anything else apart 
from a mythical relation to France, and a highly-contrived equally mythical relation to ‘la 
nation’. 
 
De Gaulle’s first government was like one of national unity, like 1944, and the drafting of the 
constitution throughout the summer of 1958 replicated his probity so that conflict could not 
arise. The four ministers of state, like deputy Prime Ministers, included Mollet (SFIO) and 
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Pflimlin (MRP). The others were an independent (Louis Jacquinot, who had been in London 
with de Gaulle) and a Radical/UDSR African, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Three Gaullists held 
portfolios, Malraux, Debré, and Michelet, but it was Debré as Garde des Sceaux (Justice) 
with a team of legal advisors in control of drawing up the new constitution who was crucial. 
This is not to say that there was not input from others, particularly Mollet, but the true 
significance of all this lies elsewhere. Many writers allude to the fact that ‘real’ power lay 
with de Gaulle (and with his cabinet run by Pompidou). The point of wider significance, 
however, is that republicanism as a doctrine could not really fault de Gaulle at this point. If a 
doctrine (parliamentary republicanism) does not understand that it – and its rivals, here 
Gaullism – is a discourse as well as a doctrine, that is, has potentially far wider connotations 
and implications than its formal elaboration, it is vulnerable to discourse itself. This means 
that the question: will you maintain a parliamentary regime?, can be answered, and was. The 
far more consequential question: will you by your complex comportment introduce what we 
might call romanticized mythical leadership into the centre of the new institutional 
configuration and its practice? cannot even be asked, because for parliamentary 
republicanism only a very rudimentary understanding of this – related to Louis Napoleon and 
ancient Roman notions of tyranny – exists; and de Gaulle had already demonstrated that he 
was neither a Bonapartist nor a Tyrant.  
 
From its June 1958 beginnings, the constitution was drafted, debated, modified, submitted to 
referendum and became law within three months. De Gaulle was called to give evidence to 
the consultative committee, chaired by Paul Reynaud. Once again, there is clear evidence 
here of republicanism’s (all doctrines’) forensic concern with doctrine, which almost by 
definition (because it is there to focus meaning rather than encourage ambivalence) could not 
ask the fundamental questions of the political use of leadership persona and character, nor 
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interrogate the issue of the mythical establishment of an imagined, politically transcendent 
relation between leader and people. On this last point, of course, the constitution would – in 
true republican fashion – be submitted to referendum, for sanction by the people. But, once 
again, this referendum would also and simultaneously be a plebiscite (as were all de Gaulle’s 
referendums). More, in fact, than a plebiscite: an act of anointing by the people. Subscription 
to doctrine precludes discursive attention to the wider symbolic implications of a political act, 
and the new space given to persona meant it would now influence greatly what was actually 
meant by republicanism itself.  
 
In the Fourth Republic’s constitution, the section on the presidency came only sixth. In the 
Fifth it came first, immediately after the section on ‘De la souveraineté’. This discursive 
arrangement of the Fifth Republic’s constitution was far more telling (though constitutionally 
inconsequential) than any of the issues debated. Having said this, yet another ambivalence – 
paradox, in fact – emerges, in that, ultimately, as the non-Gaullist drafters assumed (and 
doubtless Gaullist ones too, especially Michel Debré), the Fifth Republic’s constitution, 
particularly as regards the President, was not that different from those of the Third and Fourth 
Republics.xxvii For example, and here we come back again to the crucial role of (ambivalent) 
language, the President of the Fifth Republic – like the President of all republics, has as his/ 
her mission to maintain the integrity of the state, and of the nation, to uphold national 
independence, and the constitution itself, and ensure that the state’s institutions function. For 
de Gaulle, such a charge probably meant just about everything (excluding concern for the 
price of artichokes). We can see that the debate (still lively, 50 years later) surrounding the 
true meaning of ‘arbitre’, for example, is necessary within the forensics of constitutional law, 
but, as we have seen, to paraphrase Durkheim, all that is in the constitution in not 
constitutional. Most constitutional lawyers and political scientists at the time debated the 
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interpretation of the term ‘arbitre’. Few identified the ambiguity in the language then, and in 
relation to which meaning is elaborated. Upon a de Gaulle, that is to say a leader who is 
allowed to establish a particular kind of political authority based upon a mythical relation 
with several entities (France, people, nation, state, destiny), the words of a constitution 
bestow magical powers. ‘Arbitration’ can be interpreted as relating to anything. Authority to 
act is conferred not only upon the office of the presidency but also upon the persona of the 
President. 
 
There was further ambivalence in the public presentation of this constitution. De Gaulle, at a 
grandiose event ‘staged’ by Malraux, presented his draft constitution to ‘the people’ at a 
highly symbolic public event (with a lot of the ‘people’ – and in particular PCF protestors, 
kept well away from the action by the police). In many ways, the event was what all 
observers said it was: a republican spectacle, of a kind not seen since the late 19th century. 
The date was the anniversary of the Third Republic (4 September). The place was Place de la 
République, a huge ‘RF’ adorning de Gaulle’s podium which was fronted conspicuously by 
Republican guards, and the whole square surrounded by huge ‘Vs’ denoting the Fifth 
Republic. Observers stressed how carefully republican all this was. The symbolism, however, 
is all this and more. In fact, film and photographs of the event do not seem republican at all to 
the Anglo-Saxon eye, but, rather disconcertingly, darkly imperial, as do the towering podium 
and the, as if, praetorian guard. Over and above this spectacular symbolism, moreover, we 
need to stress that this was the public celebration not just of a constitution but of personal 
leadership. The two would be difficult to counter because (in part, recovered) memory of de 
Gaulle was now that of a man who through courage, fortitude, and lonely certainty, was now, 
at last, celebrating his mystical union with France as public spectacle. Over and above this, de 
Gaulle used this occasion as a very personal plea, a warning that for him, and France, and the 
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republic, this referendum on the constitution had to win. De Gaulle made this, like most of 
his ceremonial moments, one in which emotion was fired, but with a sense not only of the 
magnificence but also the fragility of his envisioned France and the necessary centrality of 
himself. 
 
Opinion polls at the time suggested that 50 per cent of the French – as with most texts of this 
kind – had not even looked at the draft constitution they would vote upon, and only 15 per 
cent claimed to have properly read it at all.xxviii The text itself had a significance, but more as 
an object that symbolized de Gaulle rather than as a constitutional text that defined the 
workings of the republic. We should add that the success of the constitution was also seen – 
irrespective of allegiance to de Gaulle or a ‘strong man’ – as a means to avoid a return of the 
ill-loved Fourth Republic, a communist takeover, or even a civil war.  Cast in this way, 
except for the PCF (and minimal intellectual opposition), it becomes a text that almost cannot 
be voted against. On what grounds? And of course the political parties had themselves helped 
make this constitution, even though, in reality, they were almost all split over it and the 
events surrounding it. Not for the last time in fact, not for the last time by any means, would 
either opposing or supporting de Gaulle really only benefit de Gaulle himself. 
 
The Radicals, because of the vicissitudes of the previous few years, were in pieces, and called 
for a ‘yes’ vote. The SFIO was already actually split and would probably have voted against 
but for the efforts of Mollet and latterly Gaston Defferre of the powerful Bouches-du-Rhône 
federation who supported the ‘yes’ and came through with a (September 1958) 69 per cent 
conference vote.xxix The MRP, de Gaulle’s natural allies, also recommended a ‘yes’ vote. 
Little good fortune would it bring them. This first storm of events in favour of de Gaulle 
would go on through October and November like a developing rally, a rassemblement, a 
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phenomenon more associated with de Gaulle’s RPF rally of the late 1940s.xxx Surge politics, 
rally politics, normally on the margins of political life, particularly of non-revolutionary 
republican polities, was brought right into the mainstream, with ‘opinion’, now on a national 
scale, fuelling it. It was as if the surges of opinion were now right in the centre of politics, 
aggravating the stresses the parties were under and in some cases, tearing them asunder.  
 
A further feature of these developments was the fact that the stresses and strains that were 
fracturing the parties (often, as a result of the Algerian War itself as much as de Gaulle’s 
return) had a long term effect upon some of them. Reduced to virtual electoral annihilation, 
many little groups, the PSA, UGS, and so on, and a myriad of individuals would criss-cross 
one another through political clubs and little think tanks, and small political parties, and 
become the seeds (albeit at this time without seedbeds) of doctrinal renewal of the left, of left 
Catholicism, of the trade unions, and of the right, and the extreme right, in the post-de Gaulle 
Fifth Republic. Many of the brightest, most modernizing and forward thinking political actors 
were against the now apparently unstoppable tide of political renewal.xxxi 
 
The univocal nature of the referendum was symbolized by thousands of posters exhorting 
‘Oui à la France’, implying that a No was tantamount to treason, or to allegiance to a 
communist party that was suspected of solitary allegiance to a foreign power. The turnout 
was 85 per cent (France throughout this period had a 20-25 per cent average of abstentions 
for elections and referenda), and 80 per cent of that 85 per cent voted ‘yes’ (including an 
estimated third of the PCF’s voters).xxxii The Fifth Republic became a juridical entity on the 
28 September, less than four months after de Gaulle’s re-emergence into mainstream politics.  
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From the referendum triumph, the political process then moved immediately into its next 
phase, one that would tie the non-Gaullist political parties even further into the contradictory 
situation they found themselves in. On 1 October, that is, immediately after the referendum, 
the Gaullists created a new party, the Union pour la Nouvelle République (and there is 
ambiguity even in the word ‘pour’). Distant as ever, de Gaulle forbade his name to be used in 
the party’s title. We should add that his apparent distance was only apparent. He was now 
synonymous with the new Republic. His will, his intentions, however, were ambivalent. The 
party had, therefore, to become a party that had no views of its own, because even his 
anticipated views could not be depended upon. The first casualty was his greatest supporter, 
Jacques Soustelle. From the beginning, the strongest Algérie Française supporters were 
replaced by Gaullists whose Gaullism either resembled a kind of state bureaucracy mentality 
or else was a kind of vacuous pensée gaulliste. Soustelle would happily have taken the 
presidency of the party, but de Gaulle himself imposed an administrative secretary general 
(Roger Frey). And it was Frey and his entourage who chose the candidates for the 
forthcoming legislative elections (as would Malraux, another utter devotee, four years later). 
 
The voting system chosen during the course of the summer (and therefore very hurriedly put 
in place) resembled that of the Third Republic. Any of the many forms of proportional 
representation was excluded because it might reproduce the Fourth Republic (and favour the 
PCF). The two round, single-member constituency system with a run-off one week later and 
usually leading to standings down and therefore run-offs between two candidates, had strange 
but very formative effects on the Fifth Republic. It is arguable that de Gaulle himself was 
unaware of the effects it would have. It gave him his highly successful Gaullist party, and 
would establish the party political basis of a bi-polar, and potentially bi-partisan and stable 
political regime in which the political parties would play a role that was far more positive 
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than de Gaulle could have imagined. The scrutin d’arrondissement uninominal à deux tours 
also maintained  or brought back a kind of Third Republican style local and personal element 
to legislative politics that de Gaulle did not envisage either. Such local fiefdoms, and local 
politics generally, became the breeding ground for a new breed of personalized politicians, 
even though at this time they gained their seats solely through association with de Gaulle. 
 
The newly formed Gaullists were the real winners. Their success was amplified dramatically 
by the two round system; and the Gaullists controlled most of the state machinery for 
distributing publicity, commandeering the airwaves, and had the means to finance their 
campaign. And the UNR stood unequivocally for the new Republic. The other parties who 
had stood for the constitution now had to campaign as if against it. On the first round of 23 
November, the PCF vote (as in the referendum) fell by one third to just above 19 per cent. 
The Socialists and the MRP held on to their 1956 vote of just over 15 per cent and 11 per cent 
respectively. Ahead of all three came the UNR, only two months old, with over 20 per cent. 
The ‘moderates’, the CNIP, a loose but large conservative federation that had supported de 
Gaulle (and had a lot of Algérie Française supporters) gained just over 22 per cent. The 
Radicals (depending on how the party now in pieces is measured), the Mendésists, and non-
SFIO socialists, and the Poujadists were virtually wiped off the map. The abstention rate was 
22.9 per cent – a sign perhaps of the uninterested, the very confused, the very hostile, the 
anti-parliamentarian, and those who having given de Gaulle his republic were not interested 
in legislative politics.  
 
One week later on 30 November 1958, in round two the PCF was decimated. In 1956, it had 
150 seats. With the electoral loss we have indicated, one might assume therefore a fall from 
150 to 100. They won ten seats only, such was the new logic of round-two désistement, and 
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the need for alliances, agreements, and some ideological affinity between neighbouring 
parties. By the same or similar token, the socialists and MRP who as we have seen remained 
steady in round one compared to 1956, lost respectively, 50 and 30 (they held, respectively, 
44 and 57) seats. Of the 475 sitting MPs 334, including figures such as Pierre Mendès France, 
François Mitterrand, Edgar Faure, Gaston Defferre, and other leading Radical and MRP 
figures lost their seats (over and above the 475, there were 87 seats that represented, Algeria, 
the Sahara, and the overseas Departments and overseas Territories). Between them, the UNR 
now with 198 seats, and the Moderates (CNIP) with 133, held a commanding majority. 
 
 On 21 December to crown this tumbling series of victories, de Gaulle was elected President 
by the new electoral college of 80,000 elected ‘notables’. He took office with 75.5 per cent of 
the vote against the PCF candidate who gained 13.01 per cent and the leftist UFD candidate 
with 8.4 per cent.xxxiii The UFD candidate, an academic, did rather well considering the 
ramshackle UFD had only gained 1 per cent in the legislative elections, an early though 
forgotten sign of how presidential elections can amplify a vote. But the hour was de Gaulle’s. 
A year earlier he had himself assumed he would never return to power. On 8 January power 
was formally handed over to him by the outgoing President Coty, whose decision the 
previous May had helped bring de Gaulle to power. Together they laid a wreath for the 
Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe, and de Gaulle left him standing on the pavement, 
and had himself driven down the Champs-Elysées without him, as if the Fourth Republic had 
never existed. It had, of course, and de Gaulle can only be properly understood with reference 
to it. Several more events marked the end of the sequence. Michel Debré was appointed as 
Prime Minister on the 9 January 1958. The socialists soon moved into opposition. The 
moderates (CNIP) remained (with Pinay still at Finance), as did some MRP and non-partisan 
‘technical’ ministerial appointments. A shift would begin however that would eventually 
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push all but the Gaullists and their close supporters out of the nest, some of them for a 
decade, some of them forever. 
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